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Introduction

‘Same old story, same old song/Goes all right ‘til it goes all wrong’
-- B.B. King

By 1974 the transnational criminal law regime examined in this book was well under way.1
Building on earlier treaties dealing with such diverse subject matter as undersea cables and
counterfeiting, crime suppression conventions had been and were being negotiated to deal
with crimes that, while they were not yet being called ‘transnational’,2 raised enforcement
difficulties best solved by inter-state cooperation. The 1963 Tokyo Aircraft Convention3 had
contemplated organizing principles for dealing with concurrent jurisdiction over crimes as
well as extradition between party states, both of which had been operationalized by the
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1
The historical developments up to that point are tracked in Professor Clark’s classic essay: R. Clark, ‘Offenses
of International Concern: Multilateral State Treaty Practice in the Forty Years since Nuremburg’, (1988) Nordic
Journal of International Law 57 (1988) 49.
2
The phrase ‘transnational crime’ appears to have been coined around 1975 by Professor Gerhard Mueller; see
M.C. Bassiouni & E. Vetere, Organized Crime: A Compilation of UN Documents 1975-1998, Ardsley, NY:
Transnational, 1998 at xxxi, n19.
3
14 September 1963; 704 UNTS 219, in force 4 December 1969.
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Hague Convention

4

and Montreal Convention.

5

More anti-terrorism suppression

conventions would appear later in the decade, and Interpol’s facilitation of police
cooperation was in full swing. In that year, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni took note of these
developments and expressed concern about the disconnect between this international penal
cooperation regime, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other. It
appeared that states were becoming eager to craft international law instruments to aid their
efforts in the fight against crime, but the level of cooperation required did not extend to the
provision of basic procedural protections for the individuals being investigated and
prosecuted.6
Nearly thirty years later, Professor Neil Boister took up the subject in a study of
what human rights protections existed in the body of transnational criminal law instruments
as it then stood, as well as in the cooperative machinery that it contained and was
supplemented by, such as extradition and mutual legal assistance.7 He observed that there
was both progress and room for concern; progress because the human rights issue was
clearly on the table during the negotiation of more modern suppression conventions, but
room for concern because such protections as made it into the treaties were vaguely-worded
and left a great deal of room for state discretion and accommodation only of the human
rights obligations which a particular state had already taken on. ‘The elementary point’ he
observed, ‘is that many parties to the suppression conventions may implement their
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 1970; 860 UNTS 105, in force
14 October 1971.
5
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971;
974 UNTS 177, in force 26 January 1973.
6
M.C. Bassiouni, ‘An appraisal of the growth and developing trends of international criminal law’, Revue
International de Droit Penal ,1974, vol. 45, p. 405 at pp. 427, 429.
7
N. Boister, ‘Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions’, Human Rights Law Review, 2002,
Vol. 2, p. 199 (Protection).
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obligations under the suppression conventions but may not be subject to effective
international human rights obligations.’8
This chapter will illustrate that the story and the song remain the same, arguing that
the disconnect raised by Bassiouni forty years ago remains an issue in transnational criminal
law. It will look at the history, analyze the issues in methodological terms and survey what
progress has been made, but ultimately conclude that for all but the most heinous human
rights abuses, it is difficult to discern obligations that are meaningful or effective and bind
large pluralities of states. This will be shown to be due both to the diffusion of international
human rights law itself and to the lack of political will on the part of governments to bring
the suppression of transnational crime and human rights protection into alignment.

Which rights, and whose?

It is important for this discussion to locate human rights law within the transnational
criminal law system. The suppression conventions represent the operationalizing in
international law of what Nadelmann influentially called ‘global prohibition regimes’,9 an
effort to co-ordinate crime suppression efforts among networks of like-minded states. The
starting point, then, is that this is fundamentally an anti-crime system, not one designed to
protect human rights.10 Human rights are fundamentally enjoyed vis-à-vis the state and the
8

Ibid., at p. 218.
E. Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’, International
Organisation, 1990, vol. 44, p. 479.
10
See, e.g., B010 v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2013 FCA 87 at para 82 (Can Fed Ct
App), per Dawson JA: ‘In view of the stated purpose of the [Transnational Organized Crime] Convention,
neither it nor the [Human Trafficking] Protocol can readily be characterized as international human rights
instruments.’
9
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goal of international human rights law is to both require and prohibit particular forms of
state interaction with individuals. While crimes obviously have victims, the victimization is
normally not properly classed as a human rights abuse; if an organized crime gang steals my
car for re-tooling and sale overseas, I am a victim of transnational crime but have not had
my rights breached. This is in contrast to international criminal law stricto sensu, where the
criminalization regime is often described as a way of promoting human rights norms and
deterring governments and state officials from breaching them. Such crimes as genocide or
crimes against humanity most often are perpetrated by or with the involvement of state
actors, and it is therefore unsurprising and doctrinally sound to see the Genocide Convention
or the Torture Convention characterized as a human rights treaty.11 So far as transnational
criminal law goes, while there may be ‘a duty on states to protect individuals from
transnational crime,’12 that duty is not primarily based in human rights law.13
This is not to say, of course, that there are no exceptions or that transnational
criminal law has no protective impact on the rights of individuals. As Lindsay Buckingham
outlines later in this book,14 the criminalization of child sex tourism and assorted other
crimes against children originates not from the usual crime suppression treaty stable, but by
way of the UN CRC and its Optional Protocol, the latter of which has all of the usual
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See e.g., M. Freeman & G. van Ert, International Human Rights Law, Toronto: Irwin, 2004, p. 132.
N. Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 21.
13
It is sometimes argued that the international human rights law treaties oblige states actively to protect
individuals against rights breaches by both the states and private individuals; see V. Padmanabhan, ‘To
Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Relevant Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement’,
Fordham Law Review, 2011, vol. 80, p. 73, at pp. 102-107. Moreover, one could argue that article 2 of the
ICCPR obliges states to ensure there are legal structures in place to realize their rights and to provide remedies
for breaches, and thus perhaps a crime suppression regime is required (I am grateful to Gib van Ert for this
observation). Such an already diffuse norm becomes more so if one attempts to translate it into an obligation to
enter into cooperative arrangements with other states.
14
See Chapter 13.
12
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hallmarks of a suppression convention.15 Thus, this particular skein of transnational criminal
law is expressly contemplated as part of an overall package of human rights protections for
children. As will be seen, however, this is an exceptional situation. Accordingly, the focus
here will be essentially on civil rights, particularly those which pertain to detention,
treatment of the individual, and trials—and specifically, those rights which might protect (or
not protect) from mistreatment an individual who is the target of a law enforcement
investigation into a transnational criminal matter.

Protection of human rights in the suppression conventions

As much as the TCL system is about corralling states into creating common prohibitions of
conduct,16 co-ordinating jurisdiction17 and establishing inter-state cooperative machinery,18
it is also a vehicle for what Andreas and Nadelmann have described as norm or moral
entrepreneurialism, i.e. a system for some states to proselytize particular forms of morality
so as to create broadly-based criminalization.19 This is important because the norm which is
being transplanted may bring with it impacts, sometimes harsh, on the human rights of
various players within the involved states and not just the targets of investigation and
prosecution. As Boister has it:
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As described by Neil Boister in Chapter 1.
See Chapter 1.
17
See Chapter 6.
18
See Chapters 7-10.
19
See P. Andreas & E. Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
16
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Transnational criminal law threatens human rights in many ways. Drug laws
may threaten the property rights of innocent farmers caught up in drug
eradication operations involving the use of herbicides. Innocent bank account
holders may find their privacy violated by inspection of bank records.
Trafficked humans may be subject to detention as illegal aliens rather than
treated as the victims of crime.20

The extent to which such issues arise obviously depends on the substantive and
procedural criminal machinery which a state party to a suppression convention uses to
implement its obligations. Yet as explored below, just as the conventions impose very little
in the way of obligatory human rights protections for the investigated or accused, still less is
there anything that might mitigate the harshness of the enforcement mechanisms. The
exceptional cases are the instruments designed to combat human trafficking and child sex
tourism, which often have victim protection obligations of various sorts.21 In the overall
system, however, the emphasis is very much on the prosecutorial side.
This is compounded by states sometimes using the very fact that a suppression treaty
is in play as a justification for watering down protections that might exist in their legal
orders, or even for imposing tougher consequences than would ordinarily be the case. This
is a double-edged sword, since on the one hand the goal of the suppression regimes overall
is to create a climate in which as broad a group of states as possible treats the conduct in
question as not just a criminal offence, but a serious one. On the other hand, however, are
20

Boister, Introduction, at pp. 21-22.
There is a debate regarding whether a crime control model is the best way to deal with human trafficking, as
well as the effectiveness of the human rights protections that exist in the relevant conventions; see E. Bruch,
‘Models Wanted: The Search The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking’, Stanford Journal
of International Law, 2004, vol. 40, p. 1, and Chapter 11.
21
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states which run too freely with whatever flexibility they feel the presence of the convention
provides. This is particularly and notoriously the case with the international drug control
regime under the 1988 Vienna Narcotics Convention,22 which has been acknowledged as
being unapologetically and ‘deliberately draconian in character.’23 So, for example: a South
African court justified limitations on various constitutional rights by according weight to the
relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention;24 and an Indonesian court refused to find that
execution for drug trafficking violated the right to life under article 6(2) of the ICCPR based
on the dubious holding that drug crimes constituted the ‘most serious’ crimes for which the
death penalty was lawful—comparable to genocide.25 While the inter-state cooperation
angle is discussed more fully in the next section, this same dynamic can be observed in the
willingness of states to accommodate harsher penality in partner states than their own
domestic laws would allow. So, for example, Canada’s extradition law takes no account of
the exponentially tougher narcotic sentencing laws of the US—the state with which it does

22

Discussed in Chapter 14.
Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 1988, New York: United Nations, 1988, at p. 144. Space does not permit me to take up the
interesting topic of the role played by the UN’s crime control and human rights agencies in this mix, the
‘Vienna vs Geneva’ matrix. It is worth noting here that the UNODC, initially focused heavily on crime
suppression, has lately stressed the importance of human rights protection within criminal suppression efforts
(see UNODC, UNODC and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (2012), available
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prisonreform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf> (accessed 28 April 2014). This has brought it into
conflict with the INCB; see LSE !deas, Governing the Global Drug Wars (2012), available
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR014.aspx> (accessed 28 April 2014), particularly the
contributions by Barrett and Csete. In Chapter 13 of this book, Lindsay Buckingham offers the intriguing
observation that the child exploitation TCL regime’s emergence from the UN’s human rights stable has had
implications for the effectiveness of monitoring and implementation.
24
Director of Public Prosecutions v Bathgate, 2000 (1) SACR 105 (CPD). Boister refers to another case from
South Africa where a court ‘made much of the obligation to criminalise simple possession of illicit drugs under
the drug conventions, seemingly unaware of the fact that these conventions specifically provide for
constitutional limitation of the obligation’ (Boister, ‘Protection,’ at 209, n49).
25
Sianturi and ors v Indonesia, Constitutional Review, Nos 2, 3/PUU-V/2007 (23 October 2007).
23
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the vast bulk of its extradition business—despite the fact that many American sentences
would be considered cruel and unusual punishment if they were levelled in Canada.26
The backdrop, then, is an uneven one in terms of how willing states are to allow
foreign-sourced prohibition regimes, even those arrived at via treaty negotiations, to impact
upon the human rights of their populations. This is reflected as well in a certain
permissiveness as to how the treaty obligations are implemented into national laws,
reflecting of course the traditional respect for local criminal law chauvinism but accepting
the cooperation obligations at the cost of control over or input into how implementation is
executed.
This is very clear from the human rights protection provisions themselves. Or, at
least as regards the older treaties, the lack of them: Bassiouni’s remarks in 1974 certainly
arose from the fact that at that time one would have searched the extant suppression
conventions (such as the Hague and Montreal Conventions, or the slightly later 1979
Hostages Convention27) in vain for any hint of an explicit human rights protection. In his
2002 article, Boister compared the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), concluded in 1988,28
with the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC), concluded in 2000.29
The Vienna Convention, he noted, contains no particular protections, but instead
‘incorporate[s] human rights protections by reference to the constitutional protections
available in the domestic law of the parties.’30 The more contentious penal provisions and

26

See United States v Ferras, 2006 SCC 33.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205.
28 Vienna, 20 December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95; in force 11 November 1990.
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The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS
209, in force 29 September 2003.
30
Boister, ‘Protection’, p. 208.
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some of the procedural provisions (e.g. those around extradition) are made subject to the
‘constitutional principles and basic concepts’ or ‘basic principles’ of a party state’s system,
which provides some avenues for domestic protections to block particular parts of the treaty
and for states to incorporate some of the traditional grounds for refusal of cooperation.31
Article 5(8) provides some protection for the rights of ‘bona fide third parties’ as part of the
overall obligations regarding confiscation, but the details are all left to the state and its
domestic law.32 Article 14(2) makes reference to states respecting ‘fundamental human
rights’ when engaged in illicit crop prevention and eradication that is required under this
provision, though without any detail or even a definition. Beyond this, he noted, ‘[t]here is
little more.’33
Turning to the UNTOC, the situation with the substantive provisions was even more
dire than with those of the Vienna Convention, as fewer of the provisions were left subject
to national legal orders—and where it happened it seemed designed to accommodate
domestic criminal law theories (e.g., making conspiracy offences optional for states which
do not subscribe to this kind of inchoate liability) rather than any limitations a state party
might wish to place on a treaty obligation. This suggested ‘that the pressure for unqualified
adherence is growing and that limitation is being replaced by an all or nothing approach to
legal obligation.’34 The situation was much the same for many of the law enforcement
provisions (e.g., confiscation assistance and law enforcement between states), though the
orthodox bases for refusal for extradition and mutual legal assistance were left intact and the
cooperation obligations were subject to existing bilateral treates of states parties. As with the
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Canvassed in more detail below.
Boister, ‘Protection,’ at 210.
33
Ibid., at 211.
34
Ibid., at 212.
32
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Vienna Convention, the obligations regarding confiscation and seizure were to be
implemented in such a way as to respect the rights of ‘bona fide third parties’,35 though all
of this was left to be defined under the laws of the states parties themselves.
Strides were made, however, with the inclusion of certain defence-oriented
protections of the sort notably absent from the Vienna Convention and earlier treaties.
Article 11(3), dealing essentially with procedures for bail, requires ‘due regard to the rights
of the defence’, and similar approaches were taken to mutual legal assistance,36 witness
protection37 and victim assistance and protection.38 Moreover, the extradition provisions at
Article 16(13) included the following somewhat enigmatic paragraph:

Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection
with any offences to which this Article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment
at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and
guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party in the territory of
which that person is present.

The UNODC’s guide for legislative implementation of the UNTOC indicates39 that
this provision had the modest but nonetheless significant goal of ensuring that state parties
actually had procedural provisions in place that would provide ‘fair treatment’ in
extradition; which, given the hoped-for global ratification of the convention, would not

35

UNTOC, arts 12 and 13.
Article 18.
37
Article 24(2).
38
Article 25(3).
39
UNODC, Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, New York: United Nations, 2004 at 203.
36

10

necessarily otherwise be the case. However, as Boister pointed out, it left a great deal
unclear: was it lawful for states from whom extradition was requested to even consider
whether there were issues with procedural fairness in the requesting state, which would
depart from the traditional practice of ‘non-inquiry’?40 If so, was potential lack of ‘fair
treatment’ a ground for refusal of extradition? And how was ‘fair treatment’ (‘a nonstandard term in a human rights sense’41) to be interpreted, beyond the provision’s explicit
inclusion of the rights and guarantees in either state’s domestic law, and particularly because
the travaux preparatoires were opaque on the issue?
Boister suggested that the injection of the ‘human rights issue’ into the UNTOC
was explicable in two ways: 1) an increased sensitivity of some states to accepting
obligations which might violate their human rights obligations, arising from the
development of the ‘Soering principle’ (discussed below);42 and 2) the fact that human
rights protections had been introduced into two anti-terrorism conventions which had been
negotiated concurrently with (though separately from) the TOC Convention.43 The latter
point deserves a brief look. Article 14 of the 1998 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention)44 (and the identicallyworded Article 17 of the 2000 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention)45) contained a more robust ‘fair
treatment’ obligation:

40

Discussed below.
Boister, “Protection,” at p. 215.
42
Ibid., at p. 217.
43
Ibid., at pp. 215-216.
44
15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256, in force 23 May 2001.
45
New York, 9 December, 1999, 2178 UNTS 197, in force 10 April 2002.
41
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Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures
are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be
guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in
conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is
present and applicable provisions of international law, including international
law of human rights.

This provision is of broader application than Article 16(13) of the UNTOC, in that it
applies to the entire procedure of any case which is undertaken ‘pursuant to’ the treaties,
rather than just extradition. It also makes explicit reference to international human rights law
as a standard of measure for a state’s actions, though of course this is qualified by the word
‘applicable.’ The oddness of the discrepancy between suppression conventions so close in
time was possibly explained, as Boister pointed out, by concern among the parties
negotiating the terrorism conventions around the inherently political nature of the crime and
the fact that the ‘political offence’ exception for extradition was being barred; ‘[t]he lack of
similar political alarm’ could explain why Article 16(13) of the TOC Convention contained
‘a watered down version’ of this language.46 Another possible explanation, of course, is the
ad hoc and un-coordinated way in which the suppression conventions have been negotiated,
and where the diplomats sent to negotiate on behalf of a state are not necessarily briefed on
earlier or concurrent developments.
In any event, despite there being more meat on the bones of some treaty-based human
rights obligations than others, over a century of negotiating suppression conventions and
recent attention to human rights concerns amounts to no more than this: apart from the
46

Boister, ‘Introduction,’ at p. 216, n 73.
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symbolic and/or political value of explicitly linking crime suppression and human rights in
more recent treaties, in those treaties states are only obliged to be bound by any human
rights obligations that arise from their own laws, or under international human rights law
treaties to which they are already bound. This was the crux of Boister’s argument in his
2002 article, which contained several variations on this comment: ‘...these provisions are
vague…[and] the detail of these defence rights is not provided by the convention itself;
domestic or general international human rights law provides them. This indicates an
acceptance of continued large-scale variation of these rights in national law.’47 It also
indicates, one might add, mandatory acceptance of situations where there are no, or no
meaningful, human rights protections in the national laws, but nonetheless makes it very
difficult—if not impossible—to avoid the substantive, procedural and cooperation
obligations. States have agreed to abide by their own visions of human rights protection, but
the suppression conventions themselves contain no well-defined obligations, and little
suasion.
While one might wonder about such a detailed rehearsal of Boister’s arguments from
an article more than a decade old, I have done so not just out of admiration for its scholarly
quality but for efficiency reasons; apart from some minor technical details, the state of the
law and politics is essentially the same in 2014 as it was in 2002. This is quite effectively
illustrated by an examination of the newest suppression convention, 48 the Beijing
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Ibid., at p. 215.
Support can also be found by examining the Council of Europe Convention Cybercrime, CETS No 185
(2001), the human rights provisions of which have been the subject of criticism (M. Miquelon-Weismann, ‘The
Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for
Procedural Due Process?’, John Marshall Journal of Information Technology and Privacy Law, 2005, vol. 23,
p. 329). The difference is that the EU states which are the main parties of the treaty are also subject to the
European Convention Human Rights, a point made in the next section of this paper. However, the Convention
is open to non-EU parties, and has several at the moment, including the US.
48
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Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation,49
formulated in 2010 to replace the Montreal Convention. In Chapter 6 of this book, Professor
Clark uses this treaty as a vehicle for illustrating the typical jurisdictional regime of a
suppression convention, and describes it as ‘state of the art’. While this is true for the law
enforcement machinery contained in the Beijing Convention, I know Professor Clark will
forgive me for saying that the human rights protections in it are old hat. This is to say, the
treaty hits the high mark for human rights protection within the body of a suppression
convention as established in the two terrorism conventions described above, as it contains
the same provisions—the identical ‘fair treatment’ clause in Article 11, and an
extradition/mutual legal assistance exception for discrimination in Article 14. Stasis. The
interests of states negotiating the treaties, or at least the way in which they perceive those
interests, do not seem to have changed. Nor, of course, is there anyone at the negotiating
table pushing the issue on behalf of the accused person.

Silos, Soering and September 11th

The next task is to look at the question from the other side of the lens: what impact do states’
international human rights law obligations have on their TCL obligations—particularly
those relating to cooperation which have grown up parallel to, and to some extent interacting
with, the suppression conventions? The conventions themselves contain provisions dealing
with extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation, the function of

49

Not yet in force. Available
(accessed 28 April 2014).

<http://legacy.icao.int/DCAS2010/restr/docs/beijing_convention_multi.pdf>
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which is to create a legal basis for cooperation between state parties to the conventions
which require it. However, it is expected that many states will have their own existing
bilateral and regional cooperation networks of first resort and will keep the suppression
convention machinery as subsidiary. This existing network of treaties has a troubled history
with international human rights law, which must be examined in order to properly
understand the current state of the protection of human rights in transnational criminal law.
As is well known, the story begins with extradition,50 historically a creature of
international law and executive discretion. States engaged in extradition have always had
some interest in protection of individuals on their territories, and thus developed the
traditional protections in the form of bases for refusal by the requested state, which are still
found in extradition treaties throughout the world: non-discrimination, double criminality,
specialty, political offence and (for common law states) the requirement of a prima facie
case.51 However, individuals did not have standing to invoke these protections, which were
inter-state entitlements. While domestic courts had some supervisory powers over
extradition, these tended to be driven by the ‘rule of non-inquiry’, that courts will not inquire
into the rule of law or level of human rights protection in the requesting state, as these are
matters best left to the executive. Much the same was the case with mutual legal
assistance,52 which was coming online as a law enforcement cooperation method by the
1980s.

50

See Chapter 10.
See generally W. Gilmore, ‘The Provisions Designed to Protect Fundamental Human Rights in Extradition
and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties’ in Commonwealth Secretariat, International Co-operation in Criminal
Matters: Balancing the Protection of Human Rights with the Needs of Law Enforcement, London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001.
52
See Chapter 8.
51
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A great deal of the modern development of these treaty mechanisms took place postWWII, and it was during this era that international human rights law challenged the view
that the individual was only an object of international law; state activities could be contested
on the basis that individuals had rights vis-à-vis governments. Some of the central human
rights protections were against state excesses in criminal process, and individuals slowly
gained standing in this arena. However, on the international level, the view among states
was that these two bodies of law—international human rights law on the one hand and the
law of international criminal cooperation on the other—existed largely in splendid isolation
from each other. Human rights laws and obligations were essentially territorially limited,
and governments did not bear hard legal obligations regarding what might happen to an
individual who was the target of the inter-state criminal cooperation.
This was most troublesome in situations where there were two cooperating states,
one of which adhered to international human rights standards and the other of which did not
and perhaps had a very spotty human rights record. While it might have been viewed as
unfortunate that a person would, say, be extradited to face harsh conditions, an unfair trial,
torture or death, it was not the extraditing state which was violating applicable human rights
norms and therefore it had no legal duty to refuse to extradite. Such matters were better
handled by the discretionary political decision-making at the ministerial, inter-governmental
level. This is not to say that state practice in transnational criminal cooperation did not
evolve at all commensurately with international human rights norms; the UN Model Treaty
on Extradition, for example, showed growing state tolerance for refusal to extradite for
death penalty offences, among others.53 However, it was the extradition treaties themselves,

53

UN Doc A/RES/45/116 (1990), as amended UN Doc A/RES/52/88 (1997).
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and how they reflected the policy preferences of states, from which the obligations came.
Human rights law and transnational criminal cooperation remained in separate silos.
This mutual exclusivity came under significant attack in the late 1980s and early
1990s in a series of remarkable decisions by both international human rights bodies and
domestic courts. The legal point was that by extraditing to a state where certain fundamental
human rights were threatened, a requested state engaged (and could violate) its treaty-based
human rights obligations. The most significant was the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom,54 where the court ruled that ‘the decision by a
Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 [of the
European Convention on Human Rights], and hence engage the responsibility of that State
under the Convention.’55 Soering, a German national, had appealed the United Kingdom’s
acquiescence to an extradition request from the United States on murder charges in Virginia,
which were subject to the death penalty. The court found that the conditions that would be
faced by Soering when on death row in Virginia would constitute ‘inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’ within the meaning of article 3 of the Convention, and thus
extradition would breach the United Kingdom’s obligation to proscribe such conduct. This,
even though the extraditing state was not directly involved in whatever treatment would be
faced by the fugitive, but ‘by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct
54

Series A, No. 161 (1989). See also the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in The Netherlands
v. Short, reprinted in (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1375.
55
Soering, ibid. at para 91. Conceptually this line of argument originated in what is usually referred to as
the ‘non-refoulement obligation’ in Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July
1951, 189 UNTS 150 (1951), in force 22 April 1954, and article 3 of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (1984), in force 26 June 1987. Under these provisions
states were prohibited from sending an individual to face persecution or torture, respectively. The Soering
principle represented a breakthrough because, while the non-refoulement obligations explicitly dealt with
the sending of the individual, the Court found that the sending state would be implicated in the actual
mistreatment that was the subject of the otherwise territorially-limited prohibition. So, the UK would
breach the prohibition on ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, not because it was
administering the treatment, but because by sending Soering to the US it was actively facilitating it.

17

consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.’56 Accordingly, even
though complying with its international human rights obligations would obviously have an
impact outside that state, this did not amount to extending extraterritorial jurisdiction.57
The Soering principle, then, holds that under international law states engage their
human rights obligations when they engage in international criminal cooperation that affects
an individual’s fundamental human rights. This vindicates the fundamental idea behind
international human rights law that human beings have some capacity to enjoy rights
autonomously as subjects—rather than objects—of international law.58 Outside the ECHR
space, the Soering principle was applied to the ICCPR by the UN Human Rights Committee
in several cases involving Canada. Kenneth Ng petitioned the Committee and argued that by
extraditing him to the US Canada had violated his rights under articles 6 (right to life) and 7
(prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee held that in extraditing an individual
to face a ‘real risk’ of violations of their rights, Canada could incur responsibility for
violating the ICCPR,59 and that it had done so with regard to Ng, since the technique of
execution by gas asphyxiation that he faced constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of article 7.60 Ten years later, the Committee again ruled against Canada in the
case of Roger Judge,61 a convicted American murderer who escaped from prison and fled to
Canada, from where he was deported in 1998. The Committee found that, by this time,

56

Soering, ibid.
Ibid., at para. 86.
58
S. Williams, ‘Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance’,
Criminal Law Forum 3 (1992) 191 at 222.
59
Ng v. Canada (1993), Comm. No. 469/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, at para. 14.2. See also Cox v.
Canada (1994), Comm. No. 539/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993.
60
Ibid. at para 16.4. And see Kindler v. Canada (1993), Comm. No. 470/1991, UN Doc
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991.
61
Judge v. Canada (2003), Comm. No. 829/1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 [Judge].
57

18

international law developments had moved along sufficiently that an abolitionist state, such
as Canada, had an obligation not to expose an individual to a real risk of the death penalty
being imposed, whether via deportation or extradition.62 Accordingly, Canada had violated
Judge’s right to life under article 6 of the ICCPR.
The birth and development of the Soering principle had a galvanizing effect on
human rights lawyers and NGOs all over the world, which defended or intervened in
proceedings using this new argument as sword or shield. Governments began to engage
with the issue, sometimes reluctantly, but with a realization that the increasing amount of
crime with transnational aspects meant that the protection of the individual in criminal
cooperation was likely to be a front-burner issue.63 The European Court of Human Rights
itself developed its own Soering jurisprudence, focusing in particular on torture. The
academic literature was expanding.64
However, the 9/11 attacks on New York and the shock and horror that
accompanied them dampened the enthusiasm for aligning criminal cooperation with
human rights standards, particularly among governments but also in civil society. The idea
of ensuring procedural protections for people facing criminal—and now, increasingly,
national-security-oriented—cooperation between governments was subordinated to
fighting the terrorist threat. As the public record shows,65 a number of democratic and
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human rights-oriented states (led by the U.S. but including many others) began to subvert
this idea. People were apprehended and moved around in secret, without legal process,
and the world became familiar with the phrase ‘extraordinary rendition’.66 Most chillingly,
individuals were taken to ‘dark sites’ or notoriously abusive states to ensure they could not
get access to courts, could be tortured in secret, and so that there would be no impediments
to sharing the information gleaned from them between governments.
The shockwaves of these terrible attacks had propelled us out of a criminal
cooperation system where human rights protections were evolving, into a new milieu where
national security and suppression of terrorism was the trump card that beat every other hand,
the end that seemed to justify every means. As Philippe Sands commented, ‘the events of 11
September 2001 became a catalyst for the systematic disregard of established international
rules on human rights, the treatment of combatant prisoners and the use of military force
around the world .  .  .  . ’.67 And with the rights of alleged terrorists everywhere went the
rights of all alleged transnational criminals.
Civil society fought through this dark time and pressed the case,68 to the point where
we are probably back to a situation where constructive and sensible dialogue can be held
about how we calibrate two very important goals: cooperation between states to suppress
crime, perhaps particularly terrorism, and threats to national security; but doing so in a way
that allows us to preserve the fundamental human integrity of those whom we are
prosecuting. Yet the resistance continues, spearheaded by the very governments which
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entered into obligations under international human rights law. The protections in the
suppression convention obligations, as we have seen, are paltry, and neither extradition and
mutual legal assistance treaties nor human rights treaties are being renegotiated to provide
any explicit linkage.

Conclusion: the state of play and current issues

There is no doubt that the Soering principle has left an indelible mark on the law of interstate criminal cooepration. Yet the challenge for an individual seeking to invoke a Soeringtype approach in a particular case is twofold: convincing governments that there is such a
link between the state’s cooperation activities and its human rights obligations; and
convincing courts to apply such a principle as law. This is easier in the ECHR space,69 the
birthplace of Soering itself, due to the direct applicability of the treaty in the law of party
states. The debate in the ECHR’s cases,70 as well as in those of party states,71 tends to be
around whether the fate to be met by the individual is a sufficiently egregious human rights
violation to put the cooperating state in breach of its human rights obligations.
Outside Europe, and particularly within the ICCPR network of states, the situation is
more ephemeral, and more troubled. There are certainly bilateral treaty provisions. For those
states which have taken on international human rights law treaty obligations, there are some
69
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protective interpretations of those treaties 72 that are definitely having an impact on
transnational criminal cooperation practice. That said, hard rules are difficult to come by.
There is no unity about either whether or how the human rights treaty applies to cooperation.
There is state practice, either through bilateral relations or because states accept a Soering
approach as desirable policy or as a legal obligation under domestic laws (or are forced to by
their courts). However, too many states resist the idea that application of human rights
standards to their criminal cooperation is obligatory from an international law point of view
for there to be hard norms. Even democratic, human-rights loving states resist attempts to
apply such rules.73 To be clear, it is not that states feel unable to refuse to cooperate, that
they do not take into account the views of the Human Rights Committee or the Torture
Committee, or that they do not attempt to massage cooperation requests in order for them to
avoid implication in human rights abuses, as attention to all of these are standard features of
state practice. It is that there is little acceptance of an international law obligation to do so.
One does not like to be exessively positivist, but in my view aside from a few exceptions,
one searches in vain for anything resembling a solid norm, either treaty-based or
customary.74
In terms of what hard norms there may be, in a recent article Professor Satterthwaite
makes a case (based on a review of treaties, including the UN Torture Convention, the
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ECtHR, Human Rights Committee, Torture Committee and other UN entities, and some
state practice) that states are obliged as a matter of international human rights law to ‘refrain
from transferring any individual to the custody of a state where he is at a real risk of: torture
or ill-treatment; persecution; enforced disappearance; and arbitrary deprivation of life.’75
Notwithstanding the skepticism expressed above regarding the diffusion outside the ECHR
space, this is a fairly defensible account. It is supported by the growing use of ‘diplomatic
assurances’ by requested states as a means of ensuring compliance with these obligations, a
practice ratified by the ECtHR,76 though it tends to focus around torture cases where the
cooperation standards are highest and most readily accepted.77 The fact that such assurances
are sought is some evidence that states view compliance as obligatory, though it is indirect
evidence at best, not to mention a controversial practice. In any event, outside the context of
transferring individuals, there is nothing beyond scattered state practice to evidence any
human rights obligations attaching to mutual legal assistance, and still less to policing
cooperation.
The simple explanation for this, within the consent-based system of international
law, is lack of political will. Many states do not take human rights obligations seriously.
Those which do certainly incorporate practices protective of human rights into their
transnational criminal cooperation, and within like-minded networks of states these can be
robust, but there is continual resistance to a Soering-based notion that they are obliged to do
so. Of course, one cannot wave a magic wand and create widespread adherence to
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international human rights law. There is some force to the argument that a certain margin of
flexibility is required for effective transantional cooperation against crime in a diverse
world. However, margins of flexibility can exist within rights frameworks that are
obligatory overall, yet the stance of even human rights-adhering states has been to maintain
as discretionary a state of affairs as possible, undermining the rule of law. Even what
progress has been made over the last few decades is fragile, as the reaction to 9/11
demonstrated. The gains that have been made tend to emerge from litigation, rather than
cooperation. While there is a sense of forward motion, it is slow and its direction uncertain.
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